Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

S
etting environmental standards that avoid the potential inefficiencies of "one size fits all" uniform federal standards-but prevent states from ignoring their contributions to downwind, or downstream, problems-is a challenge. Regional decision-making may offer solutions in cases where the problem is less than national in scope, but clearly extends beyond individual state boundaries. How would such organizations work in practice? Two recent attempts to use regional decision-making to control groundlevel ozone provide insights into circumstances under which regional decision-making is, and is not, likely to be successful.
The control of ground-level ozone is complex, due to the physical and chemical processes that create it. Once thought to be primarily a local problem, more recent scientific evidence indicates that ozone and its precursors can travel long distances. In the United States, two regional organizationsrepresenting multiple states-were created to try to determine strategies for reducing those externalities. The first, the Ozone Transport Commission, was established by Congress in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. The second, the Ozone Transport Assessment Group, was established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1995. This paper examines the strengths and limitations of both organizations and, in doing so, provides important guidance about the use of regional processes to solve problems involving environmental externalities. 1 We start by providing some background information on ground-level ozone. This form of pollution has a significant impact on the health and welfare of exposed populations. Health effectsprimarily respiratory problems-are the main concern at ozone concentration levels typically occurring in the United States. Beyond adverse respiratory effects, ground-level ozone also harms crops, vegetation, soils, water, materials, and animals, and impairs visibility.
Ground-level ozone is a secondary pollutant-one not directly emitted by polluting sources. It results from a combination of two precursor emissions, nitrogen oxides (NO x ) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), in the presence of sunlight. The sources responsible for NO x and VOC emissions are both stationary (large "point sources" such as utilities, or smaller, more widespread "area sources" such as drycleaners or bakeries) and mobile (either highway or nonroad sources). Reducing ozone certainly depends on controlling NO x and VOC emissions, but the processes that create ozone are complex and not yet fully understood.
Wind patterns carry ozone and its precursors long distances, particularly in the eastern United States (NARSTO, 1994) . Studies confirm ozone transport in the Northeast corridor, and identify another airshed of concern covering much of the greater eastern part of the nation (Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 1997) . Reductions in precursor emissions-especially NO x -from upwind sources can lessen ambient ozone concentrations in downwind areas (Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 1996) .
Theoretically, the appropriate level of government for setting an environmental standard is the one with both the incentive to choose the efficient level of protection and the best knowledge of underlying costs and benefits. 2, 3 For the control of ground-level ozone, where externalities may be significant, that points toward a level of government with jurisdiction over all affected areas. Braden and Proost's (1996) discussion of ground-level ozone in the context of environmental federalism contrasts uniform central solutions with decentralized solutions for five stylized cases involving two states. They find that homogeneous federal regulations are less costly on heterogeneous localities than might be supposed because "subtle but potentially important" flexibilities allow local jurisdictions to seek locally cost-effective ways of achieving the centrally imposed standard. They conclude that the primary source of inefficiency stems from the failure of the current system to deal with the transfrontier dimension of ozone. This paper complements that analysis by focusing on the potential for regional organizations to deal effectively with ozone externalities. By exploring the factors that led to the successes and failures of those approaches in this context, we are able to provide important guidance about other contexts in which regional approaches might successfully be applied.
The following section provides a brief history of air quality standards setting. Next we describe the two regional at-1 For a discussion of environmental federalism that covers both ground-level ozone and drinking water protection, see U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1997). 2 A fundamental argument for decentralized decision-making is that the information available to state and local officials, being superior to that available to the federal government, can foster the development of more efficient policies. We accept this argument although, as Sigman (2003) discusses, providing empirical support for the existence of the informational advantage is a challenge. 3 As Levinson's (2003) cogent summary of the theoretical literature on environmental federalism highlights, the absence of cross-border externalities is one of the conditions necessary for local authorities to achieve the same Pareto-optimal environmental regulations as welfare-maximizing centralized authorities.
tempts made to address ground-level ozone and the factors that led to the success or failure of those approaches. Finally, we explore the likelihood that regional approaches would be successful if applied to other environmental problems.
A SHORT HISTORY OF AIR QUALITY STANDARDS SETTING
Prior to 1970, states had responsibility for standard setting. Given transport, individual states and localities are unlikely to reduce emissions enough to achieve efficient standards-ones at which the social marginal costs of meeting the standards are equal to the social marginal benefits. For example, in Figure 1 where the x-axis represents the stringency of the ambient ozone standard and state U is upwind of state D, state U will choose an ambient standard (S u 0 ) such that the marginal cost it incurs (MC u ) is equal to the marginal benefit it receives from achieving that standard (MB u ). The efficient outcome, however, is for state U to choose a standard (S u *) at which the marginal cost it incurs is equal the marginal social benefit that results from achieving that standard (MSB responsibility for determining geographically uniform National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for common air pollutants-including ozone.
5 The administrator of EPA must set a standard that he/she judges necessary to protect the public health, allowing for an adequate margin of safety.
The amendments of 1970 also required that states develop, and submit to EPA for approval, implementation plans outlining their strategies for achieving the NAAQS. Over time, as meeting the NAAQS proved elusive, the federal government gradually increased its role in the development of state implementation plans (SIPs).
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 specify abatement requirements that increase in stringency according to the severity of an area's violation of the uniform federal ozone standardlabeled its "nonattainment" status. Table 1 specifies how abatement requirements increase with declining air quality; every state must include in its SIP the applicable required controls for each nonattainment area in its jurisdiction.
That basic framework does not address externalities because the abatement effort required of a given area depends only on its own nonattainment status, not on its transport contributions to nonattainment problems in other areas.
7 Acknowledging the externality argues for additional abatement efforts in areas transporting pollutants, even if they themselves are currently attaining the uniform ozone standard. In effect, it implies that they achieve a more stringent localized standard than that needed to comply with the federal standard. (This is reminiscent of U's situation in Figure 1, 6 Prior to 1997, the federal standard allowed for three hourly exceedances of 0.12 parts per million (ppm) over a three year period. In 1997, EPA revised the standard to an eight-hour measurement of 0.08 ppm. Areas are in compliance with the standard when the three-year average of the fourth highest daily maximum eighthour average ozone concentration in each of those years is less than or equal to 0.08 ppm. Federal Register (July 18, 1997) . The validity of the new standard was determined by two Supreme Court cases heard on November 7, 2000. The first, concerning the so-called non-delegation doctrine, questioned Congress' ability to delegate certain lawmaking responsibilities to an administrative agency like EPA. The second concerned the extent to which the Clean Air Act precludes EPA from considering the costs of pollution control in establishing the standard. 7 For a critique of various approaches that federal environmental laws have taken to address interstate externalities, see Revesz (1996) . He finds that the core provisions in the Clean Air Act may have exacerbated problems of interstate externalities. Further, he finds that the relatively minor provisions directed at controlling those externalities have been wholly ineffective. 8 This reference to Figure 1 should not be taken to imply that localized marginal costs would balance localized marginal benefits in areas meeting the uniform federal standard.
of Columbia. The Ozone Transport Commission has the authority to assess the degree of interstate transport in the region and, upon majority vote, recommend strategies to EPA for addressing nonattainment issues. The proposed controls could be applicable within all or part of the OTR (but not outside of the OTR)
as long as the Commission deems them necessary to attaining the standard anywhere in the region. Upon EPA approval of the Commission's recommendations, each involved state-whether or not they were part of the majority-must "include the approved additional control measures" in a revised SIP. The requirement could be satisfied by substituting a reduction in nitrogen oxide emissions for some or all of the reductions in volatile organic compounds after demonstrating that reducing nitrogen oxides would be as effective as reducing volatile organic compounds. The requirement can also be waived if the state demonstrates that its implementation plan includes all measures that can feasibly be carried out in light of available technology. Second, Congress mandated that all states account for transport in their SIPs. Section 110 of the Clean Air Act stipulates that SIPs must contain provisions to prevent emissions that "contribute significantly" to nonattainment problems or interfere with maintenance of air quality in downwind states. Congress did not indicate how "contribute significantly" should be defined, and it took almost a decade for the EPA to issue a regulation based on section 110.
In early 1995, EPA formed the Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG). OTAG partners included EPA, the Environmental Council of States, various industry and environmental groups, and states in the eastern half of the country.
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The participants worked to collect data and conduct analyses in hopes of achieving a consensus agreement addressing nonattainment problems associated with long-range transport-the movement of pollutants across the larger eastern airshed of the United States. Ultimately, in the late 1990s, EPA used OTAG's data and analysis in invoking section 110 to address the problem of long-range transport. The Agency ruled that by June of 2004, 22 states and the District of Columbia must reduce statewide emissions of NO x to counter ozone nonattainment downwind.
11 Controversy surrounded that rule-not surprisingly, given the dynamics underlying OTAG's regional decision-making process discussed below.
REGIONAL APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING TRANSPORT
The federal government initiated the Ozone Transport Commission and the Ozone Transport Assessment Group to augment its efforts to control ozone transport by shifting some decision-making about upwind controls to the involved states. In this section we discuss the challenges and results of those two regional organizations.
Regional Decision Rules for Addressing Externalities: The Ozone Transport Commission
While having had some success in reaching agreements about reducing ozone precursors within the OTR (discussed below), the Ozone Transport Commission (the Commission) also faces challenges to its efforts to find more costeffective, regional solutions to the ozone pollution problem. For example, while the Commission can agree to more rigorous controls within the Ozone Transport Region, it cannot relax the federal government's prescriptive control requirements assigned on the basis of areas' own nonattainment status. That means that nonattainment areas within the OTR must implement the federally prescribed controls regardless of whether the cost of meeting the standard could be lowered by shifting reductions to elsewhere in the OTR. Most importantly, the Commission is handicapped by its inability to impose controls on emission sources outside the OTR, even though those sources contribute to ozone violations within the region.
The Commission has been successful in bringing about two major initiatives. In 1994, EPA received and subsequently approved a recommendation for the adoption of a Low Emission Vehicle (LEV) in the OTR.
12 That recommendation was made by the Commission based on a majority vote of its member states. Ozone Transport Commission member states have also signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which they agreed to work within their own regulatory processes to implement specified NO x emissions limits for power plants and other large fuel combustion sources. 13 We examine whether those two initiatives are expected to be sufficient to bring counties within the Ozone Transport Region into compliance with the federal standard. Next we explore the potential to make lower cost emission reductions in upwind areas outside the Ozone Transport Region.
Examining the effects of the Commission's initiatives on ozone attainment status requires the use of complex models that simulate the creation and movement of ozone under specific weather conditions. EPA has used photochemical modeling to examine the impact of different emission control scenarios on the eastern United States. In those simulations, modelers have often used meteorological data corresponding to a 15-day high ozone episode in July 1988. We examined the effect of having the Commission's agreed upon controls for vehicles and large combustion sources in place during a similar 15-day episode.
14 Our results are given in Table 2 . Only 101 of the 252 counties in the OTR would be fully in compliance with the federal standard. 15 For 79 of those counties, less than 20 percent of their jurisdiction would be meeting the standard.
Given long-range transport, there may be gains from obtaining additional emission reductions outside the OTR rather than within it. To illustrate that possibility, we contrasted the cost of additional 12 See Federal Register (January 14, 1995 To make the desired comparison we first calculated the total annual cost of implementing all potential controls not already in place, or agreed to by the Commission, for three OTR states with high levels of ozone exposure. 17 For an annual cost of $111.7 million, those controls would reduce annual NO x emissions by about 14,000
tons. Given that all available controls would be utilized, this scenario includes very expensive controls, with the most expensive control costing $410,000 per ton of NO x reduced and the cost of all controls averaging $7,900 per ton reduced. These results are given in the first row of Table 3 .
Next, we examined the reductions obtainable if that same sum of money were spent for three high NO x -emitting states upwind of the OTR to install their most cost-effective additional NO x controls. 18 In that case, annual NO x emission reductions would be about 140,000 tons (second row of Table 3 ). Thus, one can purchase 10 times the emission reductions in the three states outside the OTR as could have been obtained using the same amount of expenditures on three states within the OTR. The most expensive control option that states outside the OTR would implement 1995-1996. 17 The OTR states were Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. The three ranked highest among the states in the region in projections of population exposure to ozone with the Clean Air Act controls and the Commission's agreed upon controls in place. 18 The upwind states were Indiana, Ohio, and West Virginia. We selected those states based on North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) area designations, and data provided by EPA that identified the NERC region with the greatest NO x emissions-the East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement (ECAR). Of the states in the ECAR region, Indiana, Ohio and West Virginia are members of the group of states that account for over half of the utility-generated NOx emissions outside the OTR. (given that they would undertake the lowest cost first and would spend up to the cap of $111.7 million) is $1,310 per ton, less than 1 percent of the most expensive control option for states within the OTR. The average cost per ton of the options that states outside the OTR would implement is $785, roughly 10 percent of the average cost per ton for the three states within the OTR. The disparity in the cost-effectiveness of emission reductions within and outside the OTR results from the fact that OTR emission sources are already subject to more stringent control requirements than sources outside the region. (As noted earlier, downwind states incur excessively high costs to achieve a given ambient standard when upwind states do not take externalities into account.) A significant limitation of our analysis is that we do not know the extent to which NO x reductions in upwind, non-OTR, states would improve attainment status within the OTR. More detailed photochemical grid modeling (allowing the imposition of controls within specified states) is needed to assess potential improvements in OTR ozone concentrations.
In summary, the Ozone Transport Commission has had some success in developing measures to address transport. As demonstrated in Table 2 , however, those measures are insufficient to bring much of the region into compliance. The inability of the Commission to impose controls on states outside the OTR may significantly limit its ability to minimize the total cost of achieving compliance within the OTR. While not conclusive (due to the lack of atmospheric modeling results), our analysis indicates that it is very likely that the cost of reducing ozone levels within the OTR could be significantly lowered by having upwind states reduce emissions of ozone precursors (see Table 3 ).
Negotiated Agreements for Addressing Externalities: OTAG
EPA formed OTAG in an attempt to better understand transport and develop cost effective solutions to the ozone problem. OTAG eliminated the primary handicap of the Ozone Transport Commission-it better encompassed the potentially relevant range of transport, comprising all states east of and including North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. However, OTAG also had one major disadvantage when compared to the Ozone Transport Commission-it had no legislated decision-making authority. That lack of authority meant that OTAG had no ability to impose controls on member states that objected to them. In contrast, the Commission had legislated authority to, upon majority vote, recommend regulations to EPA. Upon EPA's approval of those recommendations, each OTR state was obligated to comply.
OTAG's potential for success in developing a workable policy for cost-effective compliance with the federal ozone standard relied on states reaching consensus on acceptable emission control strategies (Nichols, 1995) . It faced two main obstacles. First, the precise amount and geographic dimensions of transport are uncertain and variable. OTAG undertook photochemical simulations in an attempt to reach a general scientific consensus on the dimensions and characteristics of the transport problem. 19 In spite of the great strides in understanding ozone transport that occurred as a result of OTAG's modeling, it remains a challenge to quantify the culpability of a given area for elevated ozone levels in other areas. That uncertainty made it difficult to reach agreement on specific control strategies in different regions.
Second, the 38 states involved in the OTAG process had notably diverse desired levels of precursor control. The disparity among interests reduced incentives for cooperation and made it less likely that OTAG would achieve unanimity in recommending specific emission controls.
We demonstrate that disparity by comparing the state-level cost-to-benefit indices associated with implementing controls in the subset of OTAG states that make up the OTR, and with implementing them throughout the entire OTAG region. For each OTR state, we examined the cost and benefit associated with OTRwide adoption of programs representative of the agreed upon LEV and NO x emission-reduction plans. 20 For each OTAG state (the 13 OTR states as well as 25 others), we examined the cost and benefit associated with OTAG-wide adoption of those same programs. Both simulations assume all states comply with existing Clean Air Act requirements. Estimated costs are the annual costs of implementing the LEV and NO x programs; benefits are the predicted state-level, people-hour reductions in ozone (using the meteorology of the 1988 high ozone episode in photochemical modeling simulations performed by EPA) associated with those LEV and NO x programs.
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States with lower cost-to-benefit indices have relatively more to gain from the emission reduction programs examined than states with higher cost-to-benefit indices. Cost-to-benefit indices for the OTR states when the LEV and NO x programs are implemented only in the OTR are generally lower than cost-to-benefit indices for the OTAG states when the LEV and NO x programs are implemented throughout the OTAG (Figure 2) . 22 Consider the values of state cost-to-benefit indices with respect to a benchmark of 50. When the programs are implemented only in the OTR, well over half the OTR states have a cost-to-benefit index of less than 50. In contrast, when the programs are implemented throughout the OTAG, only about 25 percent of OTAG states have a cost-to-benefit index of less than 50. Consider an index of 100 as a benchmark. When the programs are implemented only in the OTR, almost 70 percent of OTR states have a cost-to-benefit index of less than 100. In contrast, when the programs are implemented throughout the OTAG, only about 45 percent of OTAG states have a cost-to-benefit index of less than 100. In short, when regional agreements are considered within the OTR they have relatively more appeal to a greater percentage of the member states than when they are considered in the OTAG.
Further, more variation in state cost-tobenefit indices within a regional organization suggests a greater diversity of interests and reduced incentives for cooperation. Cost-to-benefit indices for the 20 Cost data specifically reflecting adoption of the Ozone Transport Commission's LEV agreement in the OTR states were not available. We modeled the National LEV here. EPA's approval of the Commission's LEV agreement acknowledged the National LEV as a possible alternative. EPA determined that the National LEV would result in emission reductions in the OTR equal to the reductions achievable through the Commission's LEV agreement (Federal Register, June 6, 1997) . In practice, due to the scale economies associated with a LEV available practically nationwide, the cost to the OTR states of adopting the National LEV might be lower than those of adopting the Commission's LEV. Cost data specifically reflecting adoption of the Commission's NO x agreement were also not available. That agreement divides the OTR into three subregions: an inner zone, an outer zone, and a northern zone. Control requirements vary, to account for transport, according to the zone in which sources are found. Permissible emission limits range from 0.15 to 0.20 pounds per million BTUs, depending on the year and the zone. We modeled a 0.15 pound per million BTU limit on NO x emissions from major sources, which reflects a more stringent limit than described in the Commission's NO x agreement (Ozone Transport Commission, 1994) . 21 To estimate costs we used the Incremental Control Measure Summaries Model referenced above. 22 Recall we measure costs in dollar terms, but benefits in terms of people-hour reductions in ozone (rather than the monetized values).
OTAG states exhibit more variation than those for the OTR states; the standard deviation of the index values in the OTAG is over six times greater than that of the index values in the OTR. Moreover, when we acknowledge that the Ozone Transport Commission did achieve majority agreement on controls similar to those examined here, and examine the cost-to-benefit indices for only the subset of OTAG states that are not OTR members, only 8 percent have a costto-benefit index of less than 50 and only 20 percent have a cost-to-benefit index of less than 100. 23 The standard deviation of the index values in those non-OTR OTAG states is eight times greater than that of the index values in the OTR states.
In June 1997, OTAG issued its final report to EPA. The consensus process led the group primarily toward untailored recommendations, endorsement of actions already being pursued, encouragement of voluntary control efforts, and suggestions for further collaborative study. Even the most specific of the OTAG recommendations left responsibility for assigning most state-by-state emission-reduction targets to EPA.
Overall, perhaps two of OTAG's most important contributions were its uniquely comprehensive technical analysis of ozone transport and the revelation of state and stakeholder preferences. As Caldart and Ashford (1998) highlight, even when a dramatic regulatory signal is needed to produce an appropriate response, negotiations can still be useful in promoting the sharing of relevant information and in facilitating a better understanding of concerns and positions among adversaries. Finally, it is likely that early and active involvement by states puts pressure on the EPA to develop cost-effective ozone regulations. Since inefficient regulations would impose higher costs for a given level of benefits, they would be more actively opposed by states that bear the costs while failing to receive additional support from states that would receive the benefits.
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While OTAG was useful in some ways, the large number of participants led to high transactions costs. Estimating the transactions costs associated with OTAG is beyond the scope of this paper; however, they were likely significant. OTAG involved over 700 participants-including individuals from the federal government, states, industry groups, and environmental groups. Over 30 meetings were held as part of the process. EPA gave the Environmental Council of States a $1.5 million grant to cover the logistical costs of arranging those meetings (expenditures associated with activities such as reserving conference rooms, making copies, and developing a web page). 25 On average, each of those meetings involved between 200 and 250 people.
26 Most meetings were held for multiple days and required participants to travel to the meeting site. States and industry interest groups bore the significant costs (wages, airfare, lodging) of having their employees attend those meetings.
EPA Directly Addresses Transport
After OTAG, the federal government tested its authority to deal directly with transport under section 110 of the Clean Air Act. In October 1998, EPA finalized a rule designed to reduce NO x emissions in states that contribute to downwind violations of the federal ozone standard. (The rule is commonly referred to as the NO x SIP Call.) 27 The rule-making-which greatly improved the federal record of accounting for externalities in the control of ground-level ozone-capitalized on the data gathering and analyses conducted by OTAG. The OTAG process did not, however, prevent controversy or legal challenges: governors of midwestern and southern states criticized the NO x SIP Call, maintaining that it was not supported by the scientific evidence of ozone transport produced by OTAG (BNA, June 26, 1998) , small business groups from West Virginia and Virginia asked a federal court to review the rule-arguing that EPA failed to fulfill its legal obligation to consider the rule's impact on small business (Inside Washington, Environmental Policy Alert, January 28, 1998), and an industry attorney criticized the rule-claiming that the Clean Air Act calls for the establishment of pollution transport commissions to address more widespread transport problems (BNA, June 19, 1998 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTR AND OTAG: IMPLICATIONS FOR APPLYING REGIONAL DECISION-MAKING TO ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES
OTR and OTAG are two interesting attempts to solve the complicated problem of reducing ozone transport. Differences in their authority, diversity, size and formation provide useful lessons about circumstances in which regional decision-making is likely to be successful in addressing externalities and what other useful outcomes might result from regional processes.
The Ozone Transport Commission succeeded in reaching agreement to enact ozone-reducing measures within the OTR. That success was likely due to clear delineation of its decision-making authority by Congress and the relative uniform distribution of costs and benefits among its member states. In spite of its success, the Commission experience highlights some of the limitations of relying on regional authorities to address externalities. Such authorities can only be created through federal legislation-a slow and cumbersome process. Defining regional authorities to deal with multiple externalities, each corresponding to a different geographic area, would be time-consuming and difficult. Further, staffing numerous regional authorities could involve significant administrative costs. 29 Finally, once created, regional authorities cannot easily be adjusted to reflect evolving scientific information-redefining the OTR when it became apparent that member states' ozone levels were being affected by emissions in states outside the northeast would have required specific federal legislation that garnered the approval of the Congress and the President.
OTAG, EPA's attempt to obtain a negotiated solution to the ozone transport problem, lacked the decision-making authority possessed by the Ozone Transport Commission, but provided more comprehensive coverage of the emission sources responsible for the externality. Overall, the voluntary OTAG process yielded important contributions-its comprehensive technical analysis of ozone transport, and the revelation of state and stakeholder preferences. The process was not successful, however, in reaching a negotiated solution to reducing ozone transport. That is not surprising when one considers the diversity of interests involved (as reflected in the distribution of costs and benefits demonstrated in Figure 2 ) and the fact that the process relied upon consensus. Further, the large number of participants was a source of high transactions costs.
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The difficulties OTAG encountered are mirrored in other regional negotiations involving the diverse interests of many participants. A primary international example is the global attempt to negotiate a strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The benefits of averting climate change vary significantly among nations. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) find, for example, that the impacts of a 2.5˚C global warming range from a net benefit of 0.7 percent of output for Russia to a net damage of almost 5 percent of output for India. Damage to the U.S. and China fall at the lower end of countries' damage estimates (at 0.45 and 0.22 percent of output, respectively), yet both would need to be a part of any successful attempt to reduce global greenhouse gases. The U.S. accounts for over 20 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, the dominant greenhouse gas, and China is expected to make up an increasingly large share of global emis-29 For example, the Ozone Transport Commission's base grant has been $650,000 annually in recent years. (Discussion with Bruce Carhart, Ozone Transport Commission, August 2002). 30 Oates (1972) and Baumol and Oates (1988) point out that transactions costs are higher when more parties are involved.
sions. 31 Negotiating a climate change agreement among countries facing very diverse costs and benefits is further complicated by the lack of a global authority that could enforce such an agreement.
Regional negotiations have a greater chance of being successful when participants share more equally in both the benefits and costs of pollution control. For example, the Chesapeake Bay Program, a consensus-based partnership involving the states of Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia, has seen its efforts to restore the natural resources of the Bay achieve some success. Adopting measures to reduce inputs of nitrogen and phosphorus from urban, industrial, and agricultural sources, and to increase levels of dissolved oxygen in bay waters, has restored fisheries and habitat, fostered the recovery of bay grasses, and yielded significant advances in estuarine science.
Nearly 95 percent of the land in Maryland and about 60 percent of the land in Virginia is in the Chesapeake Bay watershed. These states benefit directly from efforts to clean Bay waters due to their reliance on the Bay for both its seafood and tourism opportunities. Over half the land in Pennsylvania also drains to the Bay. Although Pennsylvania does not border the Chesapeake, the Bay's main source of freshwater is the state's Susquehanna river. The Susquehanna itself is an important Pennsylvania resource-providing drinking water for millions and drawing millions of visitors annually to recreational opportunities along its banks.
While proportions of three other states are also within the watershed-about onethird of Delaware, one-fifth of West Virginia, and one-sixth of New York-they are not members of the Chesapeake Bay Program. For the most part, the apparent benefits the states could expect to derive from engaging in restoration efforts are limited-the areas concerned are sparsely populated and far from the Bay.
Program membership of those three upriver states would likely pose greater challenges for the Program's consensusbased decision-making process, due to the limited benefits they gain from a cleaner Bay. 32 However, for the Chesapeake Bay Program to achieve its environmental goals in a cost-effective mannersuch as reducing nutrients entering the Bay by 40 percent from 1985 levels-Delaware, West Virginia and New York will have to participate in control efforts. All three upriver non-partner states have, as of July 2002, formally committed themselves to help with certain environmental goals of the Chesapeake Bay Program; upon doing so, each received $250,000 from the Environmental Protection Agency.
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As the ozone experience indicates, regional decision-making is likely to be successful only with a relatively uniform distribution of costs and benefits and clear authority. Prior examination of the diversity of expected costs and benefits among participants could discourage the creation of regional organizations where lack of consensus is a foregone conclusion and transactions costs are likely to be high. 31 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html. China's emissions grew at a rate of 5 percent per year between 1990 and 1995 while U.S. emissions grew at an annual rate of 1 percent; see: http://www.worldwatch.org/mag/1996/96schi.html. 32 Partnership for the three upriver states might also imply that the $10 million annually in federal funds currently provided to Maryland (30 percent), Virginia (30 percent), Pennsylvania (30 percent), and the District of Columbia (10 percent) for discretionary expenditures associated with meeting Program goals would have to be more sparingly divided between seven partners instead of the current four. Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania do not support expanding the partnership to include Delaware, West Virginia, and New York. Even when agreement on a solution is unlikely, however, there may be other benefits from involving affected parties in the federal decision-making process. Affected parties can put pressure on the EPA to choose efficient strategies, and may provide the EPA with specific information to improve the Agency's understanding of the actual costs and benefits of alternative regulatory strategies. OTAG was successful in revealing stakeholder preferences and providing crucial information on the underlying costs and benefits of ozone control strategies.
EPA has been expanding its exploration of alternative ways to involve affected parties in the regulatory process. For example, the Agency included states on a steering committee during the development of the Hazardous Waste Identification Rule.
34 EPA has also sought greater involvement from states and other affected parties in developing rules under the 1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (BNA June 12, 1998), determining clean-up strategies for Superfund sites, and formulating economic redevelopment plans for urban brownfields (EPA, 2001) . Finding ways to capture the advantages of involving affected parties in the regulatory process-without shifting the locus of decision-making to the states under conditions where they are unlikely to succeed-is an important area for future research.
